Business and Economic Concepts for a Privacy-Preserving Marketplace for ATFM Slots

E. Gringinger, S. Ruiz, C. Schütz
Schu22a (2022)
Proceedings of the 22nd Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance Systems Conference (ICNS 2022), Washington D.C., U.S.A., April 5-7, 2022, IEEE Press, ISBN: 978-1-6654-8419-0, DOI: 10.1109/ICNS54818.2022.9771484, 8 pages, 2022.
Copy  (In order to obtain the copy please send an email with subject  Schu22a  to

Abstract (English)

In case of a congestion in the European air traffic network, the Network Manager issues a regulation which causes flights to be allocated a new slot. The current operating procedure is to use a first-planned first-served (FPFS) policy to allocate new slots to the flights. Since different flights have different cost structures, the FPFS policy may not be optimal in terms of overall economic utility for the airspace users. In the SlotMachine project we aim to build a privacy-preserving online marketplace where airspace users can participate in optimization sessions regarding the allocation of ATFM slots to flights. In this paper, we present different options regarding the deployment of the SlotMachine system,and we discuss the question of the market mechanism that the SlotMachine project must tackle.

Keywords: flight prioritization, market mechanism, heuristic optimization, air traffic flow management